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CRIMINOLOGY
ECONOMIC STATUS AND CRIME:
IMPLICATIONS FOR OFFENDER
REHABILITATION
THOMAS ORSAGH*AND ANN DRYDEN WITTE**
I. INTRODUCTION
This study will evaluate the supposition that certain offender reha-
bilitation programs reduce recidivistic crime. The relevant programs
are those that enhance an offender's economic status. Programs of this
nature are highly diverse. Some are designed to effect an immediate
improvement in economic status; job placement and short-term income
supplements are examples. Others, such as those involving general edu-
.cation or job training, are designed with longer range effects in mind.
Although these programs are highly diverse and have been applied to
offenders at all stages within the criminal justice process from pretrial to
post-release, they possess one common characteristic: they attempt to
enhance an offender's economic well-being. While these programs may
be justified for a variety of reasons, a major argument advanced by their
proponents has always been that such programs reduce the level of fu-
ture criminal activity.
Our objective is to examine the theoretical and empirical founda-
tions for the hypothesis that a relationship exists between economic sta-
tus and recidivism. This article's thesis is that while conventional
rehabilitation programs aimed at enhancing an offender's economic sta-
tus have not often been successful, such programs have considerable
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promise when they are carefully designed and targeted at a group of
offenders who choose crime as a rational alternative to work.
II. THE FORMAL THEORY RELATING ECONOMIC
STATUS TO REHABILITATION
The existence of a relation between economic status and rehabilita-
tion can be deduced from neoclassical principles and assumptions. An
individual is presumed free to choose among many options, inclIding
legal and illegal activities. The particular combination of legal and ille-
gal activities chosen also presumably maximizes the individual's well-
being. To use the classic phrase from Sutherland and Cressey, the the-
ory is "individualistic, intellectualistic, and voluntaristic."'
The neoclassical theory is, of course, quite old. Becarria 2 is usually
credited with providing its first formal development. In the last decade,
the theory has been restated in a logically rigorous, mathematical for-
mat. Becker initiated the new development.3 Ehrlich4 and Sjoquist 5
provided significant refinements. The model which emerges from these
three (the BES model) provides a formal connection between economic
status and the crime rate.
In the BES model, well-being is functionally related to wealth.
Wealth is a composite index of one's assets, present income, and the dis-
counted value of future income, including in income both pecuniary
and non-pecuniary returns. The model assumes that individual well-
being is maximized by maximizing wealth. Wealth is maximized by an
appropriate allocation of one's time and other resources to legitimate
and illegitimate activities. Included in the model (theory) are several
additional assumptions, the more important of which are: (1) the total
amount of work time devoted to legitimate and illegitimate income pro-
ducing activities is a constant; that is, an hour devoted to one activity
must be at the expense of the other; (2) the two activities are perfect
substitutes in that no explicit account is taken of possible differences in
the irksomeness, ethical value, etc. of legitimate and illegitimate work;
(3) wealth increases with an increase in either activity; (4) wealth ob-
tained through legitimate activity occurs with certainty, whereas wealth
obtained from illegal activity is conditioned on the offender's success or
I E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 56 (10th ed. 1978).
2 C. BECARRIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (1767).
3 Becker, Crime and Pnishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. OF POLITICAL EcON. 169
(1968).
4 Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A TheoreticalandEmpiricalInvestigation, 81 J.
POLITICAL ECON. 521 (1973).
5 Sjoquist, Property Crime andEconomic Behavior: Some EmpiricalResults, 63 AM. EON. REV.
439 (1973).
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failure in avoiding detection and apprehension; (5) wealth obtained
through one activity is not affected by one's success or failure in the
other; (6) the negative return (sanction) associated with failure in crimi-
nal activity can be reduced to a monetary equivalent; and (7) the objec-
tive values relating to sanctions and to returns are monotonically related
to the potential offender's subjective assessment of these values.
6
Given these assumptions, and the traditional assumption that indi-
viduals try to avoid uncertainty, and seek to avoid it most when they are
poor, it follows that an increase in the return to legitimate activity will
reduce the amount of time devoted to criminal activity. Hence, rehabil-
itative programs, such as job training and income or wage subsidies,
that increase legitimate income should reduce recidivistic crime. The
model also establishes two corollary results: (1) an increase in the rate of
return to criminal activity will induce an increase in crime; and (2) an
increase in the probability or severity of legal sanctions will reduce
crime rates.
The BES formulation of the theory has been widely applied, most
often to the property crime component of the Index offenses, but also to
income tax evasion,7 to female crime rates,8 and even to homicide.9 The
growing interest in the BES model is easily explained. Its esoteric lan-
guage and its uncommonly rigorous logic are seductive. The statements
relating to economic status and to sanctions which are deduced from the
theory are intuitively plausible, conform to popular opinion, and are,
therefore, powerfully persuasive. Moreover, the theory has the added
attraction of focusing on variables which are, or at least appear to be,
capable of manipulation through deliberate public policy.
Despite its charm and the plausibility of its results, the BES model
has recently been subjected to critical reexamination. Analysis indicates
that the conclusions to be derived from the BES model change substan-
tially when some of the underlying assumptions of the BES model are
altered. Block and HeinekeI0 rejected the assumption that the "work"
involved in legitimate and criminal activity is devoid of moral/ethical
content. They adopted the more realistic assumption that legitimate
and illegitimate work may have different values, and indeed, that there
may be no monetary equivalent for some kinds of work. Block and
6 Heineke, Economic Moade& of Criminal Behavior: An Overview, in EcONOMIC MODELS OF
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 1 (J. Heineke ed. 1978).
7 Allingham & Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion A Theoretical Ana sis, I J. PUB. ECON. 323
(1972).
8 Bartel, Women in Crime: An Economic Ana.#s, 17 ECON. INQ. 29 (1979).
9 Ehrlich, The Deterrent Eect of Capital Panishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM.
ECON. REV. 397 (1975).
10 Block & Heineke, A Labor Theoretic Ana.ysis of the Criminal Choice, 65 AM. ECON. REV.
314 (1975).
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Lind1' replaced the assumption that one's wealth can be reduced to zero
through the imposition of legal sanctions with the more realistic assump-
tion that sanctions have a strict upper limit. On constitutional grounds,
the state may not reduce one's income below the subsistence level.
12
Heineke t3 rejected the assumption that total work time is a constant. In
his model, leisure becomes an option; and, accordingly, one chooses an
optimum combination of legitimate and criminal activity and leisure.
Heineke also rejected the assumption that all sanctions can be expressed
in monetary equivalents.
The more general theory emerging from the work of Heineke,
Block, and Lind (the HBL model) carries with it an extremely impor-
tant result. Adopting the more plausible axiomatic base of the HBL
model precludes the categorical statement that an increase in legitimate
income, through welfare, job training, work release, etc., reduces the
likelihood that an individual will commit an offense. Moreover, the ef-
fect of changes in the rate of return to illegitimate activity, and of
changes in the probability and severity of punishment, becomes ambig-
uous. Thus, the HBL model offers no clear-cut policy prescription:
"... in the area of law enforcement . . . policy recommendations do
not follow from theory but rather require empirical determination of
relative magnitudes."1 4 Theory becomes essentially agnostic.
III. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE RELATING ECONOMIC
STATUS TO REHABILITATION
Since deductive proof for the existence of a relationship between
crime and economic status is not possible, its existence depends upon a
particular configuration of the model's parametric values and is, there-
fore, environment-specific. Thus, an evaluation of the efficacy of eco-
nomic status instruments must be based upon empirical analysis. If
direct measures of the model's parameters existed, the task would be
quite simple. Because such measures do not exist, this evaluation shall
take the form of an empirical test for the existence of a relation between
economic status and crime. Accordingly, we propose to analyze four
distinct groups of empirical studies for evidence showing the existence of
the relation: (1) studies using aggregate data examining the relationship
I Block & Lind, Crime and Pwnishment Reconsidered, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 241, 245-247 (1975).
12 The literature dealing with the minimal rights of convicted persons to food, clothing,
housing, and medical care is extensive. See, e.g., S. KRANTz, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS (1973); S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL
CORRECTIONS (2d ed. 1973); Note, James v. Wallace: Minimum Constitutional Slandardsfor Living
Conditions in Piron, 29 BAYLOR L. REv. 180 (1977).
13 Heineke, supra note 6.
14 Block & Heineke, supra note 10, at 323.
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between unemployment and crime, (2) studies using aggregate data ex-
amining the relationship between income and crime, (3) studies using
individual data exploring the relationship between economic viability
and crime, and (4) studies evaluating the effectiveness of programs
designed to improve economic viability.
A. INDIRECT EVIDENCE BASED ON AGGREGATIVE DATA
If economic status affects the decision to engage in criminal activ-
ity, crime rates should logically be higher among persons who are unem-
ployed and among persons with lower incomes. Both hypotheses have
been subjected to detailed examination. 15 The results below derive from
those studies that have used a more sophisticated statistical apparatus
for testing the validity of these hypotheses.
I. The Relationship Between Unemployment and Crime
In the last two decades, an extensive literature bearing upon the
relationship between unemployment and crime has developed. Gilles-
pie 16 has examined the pre-1975 literature. He reports three studies
which assert the existence of a statistically significant relationship be-
tween the unemployment rate and crime, but seven studies in which no
significant relation could be found. 17 Indeed, almost all of the latter
studies show that, for some model specification, the coefficient of the
unemployment variable is negative, though never statistically signifi-
cant.
Evidence since Gillespie's survey provides no stronger support for
the proposition that "unemployment causes crime." The longitudinal
study by Land and Felson *8 shows that the unemployment rate has no
appreciable effect on the crime rate, while Brenner 19 argues that it does.
15 Braithwaite, Unemployment and Crime: An Interpretation of the International Eoidenc, in PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY (Sydney Univ. Law School, ser. 36 at 54
(1978)); R. GILLESPIE, ECONOMIC FACTORS IN CRIME AND DELINQUENCY: A CRITICAL RE-
VIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (Dep't of Justice, Nat'l Inst. of Law Enforcement and
Crim. Just. 1975); Hearings on the Social Costs of Unemployment Before the Joint Economic Committee,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Witte, Unemployment and Crime: Insights and Research on Individuals);
[hereinafter cited as Hearings]; Orsagh, Unemployment and Crime: An Objection to Professor Brenner's
View, 71 J. CRIM. L. & C. 181 (1980); LONG & WRITE, CURRENT ECONOMIC TRENDS: IM-
PLICATIONS FOR CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A DE-
CLINING ECONOMY (1981) (forthcoming).
16 R. GILLESPIE, szpra note 15.
17 Id. at 55.
18 Land & Felson, A General Framework for Building Dynamic Macro Social Indicator Models:
Including An Analysis of Changes in Crime Rates and Police Expenditures, 82 AM. J. Soc. 565 (1976).
19 Brenner, Estimating the Social Costs of National Economic Poliqy: Implications for Mental and
PhysicalHealth, and CriminalAgression, in I ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF THE EMPLOYMENT ACT
OF 1946-30TH ANNIVERSARY REVIEW, Joint Economic Committee, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976) (paper no. 5).
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However, the Center for Econometric Studies20 has shown that Bren-
ner's results are extremely sensitive to changes in model specification.
Hence, Brenner's results, too, should be viewed as inconclusive. Using a
simultaneous equations model and data for 1950-1974, Fox also finds no
relationship.2 1 Orsagh, using a quite different model and the same time
frame, finds a positive, non-significant relationship and observes that, at
best, the magnitude of unemployment's impact on crime is quite
small.2 2 Finally, Leveson's data for approximately the same time period
shows a statistically significant relation between crime rates and youth
unemployment, but no relation to adult unemployment.
23
The post-1975 cross-sectional evidence is equally ambiguous. Bar-
tel reports positive coefficients for the female unemployment rate for
most, but not all, specifications of her model.2 4 However, none of the
coefficients are statistically significant. The Center for Econometric
Studies finds a relation between crime rates and long-term unemploy-
ment, but no relation to short-term unemployment.2 5 Forst 26 and
Wadycki and Balkin 27 find no relation for Index offenses; Vandaele re-
ports no relation for automobile theft.
2 8
2. The Relationship Between Income and Crime
According to the BES model, the propensity for crime should vary
inversely with legitimate income prospects and directly with illegitimate
income opportunities. Because direct empirical measures of these in-
come variables do not exist, an acceptable test of these two hypotheses is
not possible. Although a large number of studies purport to test these
hypotheses, their evidence defies definitive interpretation because of the
uncertain correspondence between the empirical measure actually used
and the measure that theory requires. Consider, for example, the am-
20 CENTER FOR ECONOMETRIC STUDIES OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, HOOVER INSTITU-
TION, A REVIEW OF SOME OF THE RESULTS IN ESTIMATING THE SOCIAL COST OF NATIONAL
ECONOMIC POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR MENTAL AND PHYSICAL HEALTH, AND CRIMINAL
AGGRESSION (1979) (Mimeo.).
21 J. Fox, FORECASTING CRIME DATA 29 (1978).
22 Orsagh, A Cn'minometric Model of the Criminal Justice System, in MODELS IN QUANTITA-
TIVE CRIMINOLOGY (J. Fox ed. 1981).
23 1. LEVESON, THE GROWTH OF CRIME (1976).
24 Bartel, supra note 8.
25 CENTER FOR ECONOMETRIC STUDIES OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, HOOVER INSTITU-
TION, PROPERTY CRIME AND THE RETURNS TO LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE ACTIVITIES
(Technical Report CERDCR-2-78).
26 Forst, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: Further Empirical Findings, 2 POL'Y ANALYSIS
477 (1976).
27 Wadycki & Balkin, Participation 1)7 Illegitimate Activities. Forst r Model Revisited, 8 J. BE-
HAVIORAL ECON. 151 (1979).
28 Vandaele, An Econometric Model of Auto Theft in the United States, in ECONOMIC MODELS
OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 303 (J. Heineke ed. 1978).
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biguous treatment accorded to one common measure, per capita in-
come. Grieson, 29 Beasley and Antunes,30 and Swimmer3' use per capita
income as an index of legitimate income. Fleisher, 32 Weicher, 33 and Sjo-
quist,34 using measures analogous to per capita income, assign the same
interpretation. Vandaele interprets per capita income as an index of the
demand for illegal goods.3 5 But other, equally respectable authors-
Reynolds, Ehrlich, McPheters and Stronge, Forst, and Bartel-use the
same measure as an index of illegitimate income. 36 Of course, control
variables are used in the above studies in an effort to force the measure
to reflect either legitimate or illegitimate income, as the particular study
requires; but, unfortunately, the success of this endeavor cannot be sci-
entifically demonstrated. One's interpretation of the measure becomes
largely a matter of faith.
Interpreting the empirical research relating to legitimate income is
further complicated, and comparative analysis is rendered virtually
meaningless, because of the many statistical proxies employed in the
literature for this variable. Beasley and Antunes, Swimmer, and
Vandaele use per capita income;3 7 Fleisher and Weicher, the mean fam-
ily income of the second lowest quartile;38 Sjoquist, the wages of manu-
facturing employees;3 9 Morris and Tweeten and Greenwood and
Wadycki the percentage of families living in poverty;40 Reynolds, the
annual income of laborers;4' Ehrlich and Bartel, the percentage of fami-
lies earning less than one-half of median income;42 and Forst, the per-
centage of income recipients having an income between the median and
29 R. GRIESON, THE DETERMINANTS OF JUVENILE ARRESTS (WORKING PAPER No. 87,
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, 1972).
30 Beasley & Antunes, The Etiology of Urban Crime: An Ecological Analysi , 11 CRIMINOLOGY
439 (1974).
31 Swimmer, Measurement of the Effectiveness of Urban Law Enforcement-A Simultaneous Ap-
proach, 40 S. ECON. J. 618 (1974).
32 Fleisher, The Efect of Income on Delinquency, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 118 (1966).
33 Weicher, The Eect ofIncome on Delinquenov: Comment, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 249 (1970).
34 Sjoquist, supra note 5.
35 Vandaele, supra note 28.
36 See Ehrlich, supra notes 4 and 9; Forst, supra note 26; Forst, The Deterrent Eect of Capital
Punihment: A Cross-State Anaosis of the 1960"s, 61 MINN. L. REV. 743 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as The Deterrent E.fect]; McPheters & Stronge, Law Enforcement Expenditures and Urban Crime, 27
NAT'L TAX J. 633 (1974); A. Bartel, supra note 8; M.O. Reynolds, Crimes for Profit: Econom-
ics of Theft (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin).
37 Beasley & Antunes, supra note 30; Swimmer, supra note 31; Vandaele, supra note 28.
38 Fleisher, supra note 32 at 123; Weicher, supra note 33 at 250, 251.
39 Sjoquist, supra note 5 at 439.
40 Greenwood & Wadycki, Crime Rates and Public Expendituresfor Police Protection: Their Inter-
action, 31 REV. Soc. EON. 138 (1973); Morris & Tweeten, The Costs of Controlling Crime: A
Study in Economies of City Lif, 5 ANNALS REGIONAL Sc. 33 (1971).
41 M.O. Reynolds, supra note 36.
42 Ehrlich, supra note 4, at 539; Bartel, supra note 8.
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poverty income levels. 43
Given conceptual and interpretive problems such as these, and
other difficulties enumerated below, it is not surprising that the surveys
of this literature44 provide exceedingly thin support for an income-crime
relation. The subsequent work of Bartel, Forst, Vandaele, and others
provides no stronger support.
45
The inescapable conclusion to be reached from this survey is that
the BES model's hypothesis about the relationship between unemploy-
ment and income is not confirmed by tests performed on aggregative
data sets. One must conclude either that the theory is incorrect, or that
the empirical tests are invalid.46 There are substantial grounds for as-
serting the inadequacy of the empirical tests, some of which have been
indicated above. Expansion of the litany of deficiencies is relatively
easy.47 For example, the theory has a micro-foundation, whereas the
evidence is based on aggregative data. The theory applies to a popula-
tion of individual potential offenders, whereas the data often relate to a
much more general population. The theory assumes subjective esti-
mates of income and of sanctions, while the data adopt objective values.
The need to introduce control variables into the empirical analysis raises
particularly knotty problems. In regression analysis, the common meth-
odology of the selection of variables to include and to exclude, is often
arbitrary, yet the decision often affects statistical outcome materially.
Transforming a theoretical model into a correctly specified, correctly es-
timated empirical model raises additional problems which often find an
ad hoc, essentially arbitrary resolution. The important fact is that the
results of empirical research on aggregative data are to a very considera-
ble extent the artifacts of discretionary research effort.4 8 Hence, it is not
surprising that empiricists have neither discovered a consistent, reason-
ably precise relationship between economic status and crime, nor
reached a consensus that such a relation does not exist.
B. EVIDENCE BASED ON INDIVIDUAL DATA
Although the crime causation theory which suggests a relationship
43 Forst, The Deterrent Efect, supra note 36.
44 R. GILLESPIE, supra note 15.
45 Bartel, supra note 8; Forst, supra notes 26 and 36.
46 A third logical possibility exists: both the theory and the tests may be valid, but the
tests may not have been powerful enough, given the inherent variation in the data, to cause
the consistent rejection of a false null hypothesis. Even if the alternative hypothesis were true,
the fact that the null hypothesis is so infrequently rejected implies that the magnitude of the
effect must be quite small, not differing appreciably from zero.
47 Orsagh, Empirical Criminolog." Interpreting Results Derived From Aggregate Data, 16 J. RE-
SEARCH CRIME & DELINQUENCY 294, 295-306 (1979).
48 Id. at 294.
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between economic viability and crime is a model of individual behavior,
few studies have used individual data to directly explore the nature of
this relationship. Although early studies of the relationship between un-
employment and crime used very simple analytic techniques,4 9 these
tests indicate that better labor market performance was associated with
parole success and lower levels of criminal activity.50 More recently,
empiricists used multivariate (often simultaneous equations) statistical
techniques. The work of Cook provides an early example.51 Cook ex-
amines the relationship between parole success and job satisfication as
measured by job stability. Using profit analysis, Cook controls for a
number of other factors believed to affect parole success such as prior
record, type of offense, marital status. Cook found parole success and
arrests significantly related to job stability. By using both single equa-
tion 52 and simultaneous equation Tobit techniques,53 Witte, Sickles,
and Schmidt explored the effect of wages and unemployment on length
of sentence and conviction rates. This work provides consistent but
weak support for the expected inverse relationship between higher
wages and crime, but weak, if any, support for the relationship between
unemployment and crime.
Taken together, the work using individual data surveyed above and
the work exploring the nature of labor markets for ex-offenders5 4 indi-
cate that although offenders have little trouble finding jobs, those jobs
they find are rather unattractive. The unpleasant nature of these jobs
leads to high turnover rates. Offenders typically remain voluntarily un-
employed for varying periods between jobs. Cook suggests that offend-
ers will only "drop out" of crime if they are able to find relatively
pleasant jobs with relatively good wages and advancement opportuni-
ties.55 Unfortunately our knowledge of the labor market for these indi-
viduals 56 indicates that ex-offenders are unlikely to find such jobs
49 See, e.g., G. POWNALL, EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS OF RELEASED OFFENDERS (report to
the Manpower Administration, U.S. Dep't of Labor 1969); D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM (1964); Evans, The Labor Market and Parole Success, 3 J.
HuMAN RESOURCES 201 (1968).
50 See, e.g., the articles cited in note 49 supra.
51 Cook, The Correctional Carrot: Better Jobsfor Parolees, 1 POL'Y ANALYSIS 11, 45 (1975).
52 Witte, Estimating the Economic Model of Cime with Individual Da.a, 94 Q. J. ECON. 57
(1980).
53 P. SCHMIDT & A.D. WrrrE, THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME: APPLICATIONS, THEORY
AND METHODS (1981) (forthcoming); Sickles, Schmidt, and Witte, An application of the simulta-
neous Tobit model: A study of the detenminants of criminal recidivism , 31J. ECON. & Bus. 166 (1979).
54 For a survey, see Hearings, supra note 15, at 25-34.
55 Cook, sup/ra note 51, at 45-47.
56 Witte & Reid, An Expfloration of the Determinants of Labor Market Perfonnance for Prison
Releasees, 8 J. URBAN EON. 313 (1980).
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without aid and even with aid often prove to be quite unstable employ-
ees.
Recently the Vera Institute5 7 and the Rand Corporation 58 inter-
viewed extensively prison inmates to explore the relationship between
economic viability and crime. The findings indicate that the relation-
ship between economic viability and crime is far more complex than
suggested by our models. 5 9 Specifically, this research suggests that the
nature of the relationship between unemployment and crime depends
on the type of crime and individual involved.
Sviridoff and Thompson identify four distinct types of relationships
between unemployment and crime.60 First, the commission of some
types of crime (white collar crime, employee theft) requires employ-
ment. For these types of crime, one would expect a decrease rather than
an increase as unemployment rises. Second, some offenders mix employ-
ment and crime. These individuals either moonlight in criminal activi-
ties or use their legitimate jobs as a front (e.g., fences, drug dealers). For
this group, like the first, employment and crime go hand in hand. For
individuals moonlighting in crime, unemployment may increase crimi-
nal activity as predicted by our simple models; however, for those using
legitimate employment as a front, unemployment may make criminal
activity more difficult and may lead to decreased rather than increased
illegal activity. Third, some offenders, particularly younger offenders,
appear to alternate between employment and crime. For these individ-
uals unemployment or dropping out of the labor force generally indi-
cates a switch from legal to illegal income generating employment
rather than unemployment as we normally perceive it. For individuals
in this group, we would expect either a rise in unemployment or a drop
in labor force participation to be associated with increased criminal ac-
tivity. Apparently our simple model, "unemployment causes crime," is
most relevant for this group. Finally, a small group (5 to 10 percent of
property offenders) is firmly committed to crime for a primary means of
support. For this group unemployment or non-participation in the la-
bor market is a way of life and no relationship between unemployment
and crime is expected.
Decreased employment is associated with decreased criminal activ-
ity only for individuals in group three, discussed above, and some indi-
viduals in group two. However, one might well expect a direct
57 SVIRIDOFF & THOMPSON, LINKAGES BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT AND CRIME: A QUALI-
TATIVE STUDY OF RIKER'S RELEASEES (WORKING PAPER, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUST., 1979).
58 J. PETERSILIA, P. GREENWOOD, & M. LAVIN, CRIMINAL CAREERS OF HABITUAL
FELONS (1977).
59 Id. See also SVIRIDOFF & THOMPSON, supra note 57.
60 Id.
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relationship between the quality of job and decreased criminal activity
for some members of group one, two, and three. This expectation may
provide at least a partial explanation for the stronger relationship found
between job quality and crime than between unemployment and crime
at the individual level.
C. PROGRAM-SPECIFIC EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Gauging the effect of improved economic viability on recidivistic
crime-provides another method to evaluate the relationship between ec-
onomic status and crime. A review of rehabilitation programs that em-
ploy economic status instruments as a means of reducing recidivism
yields mixed results. Wright and Dixon's examination of 96 juvenile
delinquency programs shows that, at best, vocational training and edu-
cation programs produce results that are promising.61 For example,
work/study programs had no impact on recidivism or employment
rates; job training and placement services had some impact on older
juveniles, but not younger ones; and one work program showed positive
results for black females, but no effect for white females or for males of
either race.62 Robin's analysis of one juvenile employment program63
showed that juveniles who accepted employment were just as likely to
recidivate during and after the project as those who did not.
Rovner-Pieczenik reviewed fifteen pretrial intervention programs
designed to improve the economic status of younger offenders.64 While
recidivism rates based on arrests appear to have declined during the pro-
gram period, the longer term employment and recidivism effects could
not be evaluated. Taggart examined two programs, Project Crossroads
and the Manhattan Court Employment project, and concluded that the
programs were effective for adults but not for teenagers.65
In-prison projects produce similarly diverse results. Taggart ex-
amined 55 projects based on the Riker's Island model for in-prison voca-
tional training and found no effect on post-prison employment
experience. 66 He also reports no relation between prison-industry work
experience and post-release employment rates. Twenty-five vocational
training programs examined by Abt Associates showed no impact on
61 Wright & Dixon, Communiy Prevention and Treatment ofJuvenile Delinqueng: A Review of
Evaluation Studies, 14 J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQUENCY 35 (1977).
62 Id. at 48.
63 Robin, Anti-poverty Programs and Delinquenqv, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 323, 331 (1969).
64 R. ROVNER-PIECZENIK, PRETRIAL INTERVENTION STRATEGIES: AN EVALUATION OF
POLICY-RELATED RESEARCH AND POLICYMAKER PERCEPTIONS, (1974).
65 TAGGART, THE PRISON OF UNEMPLOYMENT 108 (1972).
66 Id. at 41-44.
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post-release employment, but a slight impact on recidivism rates.67
Analysis of post-release services is equally inconclusive. Taggart
concludes that manpower programs for ex-offenders have been ineffec-
tive.68 Although the lack of a uniform measure of recidivism hampered
comparability across programs, Toborg and others believe that employ-
ment services reduce recidivism rates in the short run, but that the recid-
ivistic experience of the control and experimental populations becomes
similar within three years of release.6 9 The one Manpower Develop-
ment and Training program for ex-offenders which permits scientific
evaluation showed a favorable employment effect, but no recidivism ef-
fect.70 A sample of Job Corps programs operating in 1977 showed that
six months after program completion male offenders were less likely to
be arrested than non-program participants. 7' The facts that females did
not do better than their comparison group and that the control groups
were not randomly selected vitiate the significance of this finding.
Work release held such great promise that within a decade of its
introduction, forty-two states had programs. Four of these state pro-
grams have been evaluated. Evidence suggests that the program in Cal-
ifornia substantially reduced recidivistic crime among former work-
releasees. 72 North Carolina's program had no impact on overall recidi-
vism rates, but appears to have shifted recidivistic crime toward less seri-
ous offenses. 73  On the other hand, work release programs in
Massachusetts 74 and in Florida 75 had no significant effect on post-release
behavior, measured in a wide variety of ways.
Despite the comprehensiveness of some of the surveys reported
above, our knowledge of the effect of rehabilitative programs is based on
an extremely small sample of programs. The countless programs under-
written by the once inexhaustible CETA fund have not been, and prob-
ably could not be, subjected to comprehensive evaluation. The same is
67 ABT ASSOCIATES, INC., AN EVALUATION OF MDTA TRAINING IN CORRECTIONAL IN-
STITUTIONS (1971) (vols. 1-3 and final summary, Washington, D.C.: AAI).
68 TAGGART, supra note 65, at 80-83.
69 M. TOBORG, L. CENTER, R. MILKMAN, & D. DAVIS, THE TRANSITION FROM PRISON
TO EMPLOYMENT: AN ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNITY-BASED ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (1977).
70 ROVNER-PIECZENIK, supra note 64.
71 MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., EVALUATION OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
THE JOB CORPS PROGRAM: FIRST FOLLOW-UP REPORT (Princeton, N.J. 1978).
72 Jeffery & Woolpert, Work Furlough as an Alternative to Incarceration: An Assessment of its
Ejects on Recidivism and Social Cost, 65 J. CRIM. L. & C. 405, 414 (1974); Rudoff & Esselstyn,
Evaluating Work Furlough.- A Followup, 37 FED. PROBATION 48 (1973).
73 Witte, Work Release in North Carolina-A Program that Works!, 41 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROB. 230 (1977).
74 D. LECLAIR, AN EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF THE MCI-CONCORD DAY WORK
PROGRAM, (Massachusetts Department of Corrections 1972).
75 Waldo & Chiricos, Work Release and Recidivism. An Empirical Evaluation of Social Poliy, I
EVALUATION Q. 87, 102-104 (1977).
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true of the slightly less ambitious Neighborhood Youth Corps program.
The magnitude of the problem might be gauged by considering the re-
view of juvenile delinquency programs by Wright and Dixon.
76 Of
6,600 programs surveyed, only 96 provided empirical data. If one im-
poses upon these few programs the essential condition that the program
randomize its subjects and that it use a control group, the 6,600 pro-
grams probably would be reduced to a very small number, possibly zero.
IV. RECENT POLICY INITIATIVES
Two new programs, designed to enhance the economic status of
prison releasees, were introduced in the early 1970s. Baltimore imple-
mented a transitional aid program, termed LIFE (Living Insurance for
Ex-Prisoners), in 1971. 77 A non-random sample of "high risk" releasees
was selected. The individual selected for program participation had to
be a male, less than 45 years old, with several prior convictions, at least
one of which had to be a property offense. He could not be an alcoholic
or drug addict, could not have participated in a work release program
for more than three months, and could not have more than $400 in
savings. This population was divided randomly into four groups:
Group A received job placement services only; Group B received an in-
come subsidy of $60 per week for 13 weeks; C received both job place-
ment services and the income subsidy; D, the control group, received
neither money nor services.
In the first year after project completion, the performance of
Groups A and D (no income supplement) was similar. Groups B and C
had lower recidivism rates (as measured by arrests) for property crime
offenses, but their employment record and their non-property offense
rates were similar to the control group. 78 Despite these mixed results,
from a cost/benefit point of view, the LIFE program was a success.
79
Georgia & Texas have since implemented the LIFE program,
renamed TARP (Transitional Aid Research Project), with several sub-
stantive modifications. Whereas LIFE was restricted to a select popula-
tion of releasees, TARP was available to all releasees applying to their
state's Employment Service Office, if one existed in.their area.80 Con-
trary to the LIFE program, in which an ex-offender's legitimate earn-
76 Wright & Dixon, supra note 61, at 36-37.
77 LENIHAN, WHEN MONEY COUNTS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF PROVIDING FINAN-
CIAL AID AND JOB PLACEMENT SERVICES TO RELEASED PRISONERS (Bureau of Social Sci-
ence Research, Inc., Washington, D.C. 1976).
78 See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNLOCKING THE SECOND GATE (1977).
79 Mallar & Thornton, Transiional Aid for Released Prisoners: Evidence/om the LIFE Expei-
ment, 13 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 208, 233 (1978).




ings did not diminish his income subsidy, TARP reduced the income
subsidy if legitimate earnings were reported. Finally, state agencies ad-
ministered TARP, whereas a non-profit, non-governmental agency ad-
ministered LIFE.
Given the nature of these program modifications, that TARP's ex-
perience has been disappointing is not surprising. The experimental
and control groups have similar recidivism rates when measured by ar-
rests. And, more significantly, employment rates and earnings of the
experimental group are lower than those of the control group. However,
when one controls statistically for the work disincentive of the program,
individuals receiving TARP payments had significantly fewer arrests for
both property and non-property offenses than individuals who received
no such payments. In addition, consistent with job search theory, em-
ployed members of the treatment group earned higher weekly wages
than members of the control group.8' Considering the indiscriminant
way in which TARP was administered, these results are quite encourag-
ing.
An alternative supported work program, instituted by the Vera In-
stitute of Justice in 1972, provided subsidized employment to selected
ex-addicts. The supported work program created a "low stress" environ-
ment, involving close supervision, peer support, and a gradual increase
in environmental conditions that demand responsible behavior. Cash
bonuses and "psychic rewards" were offered to participants as a means
of developing self-discipline and other behavior patterns conducive to a
successful work life.82 An interim evaluation of the program indicates
higher earnings, fewer arrests, and less welfare benefits for participants
than for the control gorup, and a favorable cost/benefit ratio.8 3
The Vera model has since been substantially revised and extended
under the general direction of the Manpower Development and Re-
search Corporation. The expanded program included four population
subsets: ex-addicts (the Vera population), ex-offenders, AFDC mothers,
and young school drop-outs. Program details, job characteristics, and
the type of administrative agency vary from location to location, but the
essential features of the Vera model are retained. Results for the pro-
gram are mixed. 4 For all groups, the experimental populations did bet-
ter than the control group in labor market performance during program
81 See P. Rossi, R. BERK, & K. LENIHAN, MONEY, WORK AND CRIME (1980).
82 This description was provided to the authors by the Vera Institute staff which ran the
original program.
83 Friedman, An Interim Evaluation ofthe Supported Work Experiment, 3 POL'Y ANALYSIS 147,
153-68 (1977).
84 BOARD OF DIRECTORS, MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION SEARCH CORP., SUMMARY AND
FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL SUPPORTED WORK DEMONSTRATION (1980).
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participation. After termination of the program, ex-offenders, but not
ex-addicts, continued to show better labor market performance than the
control population, although the differences between the control and
experimental populations were not significant. The impact on recidi-
vism rates, based on arrests and incarcerations, and derived largely from
self-reports, was mixed: ex-addicts appeared to be favorably.affected,
but ex-offenders were not.
V. FUTURE RESEARCH: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
In summary, the neoclassical theory of crime causation in its more
general HBL formulation yields no a priori support for the relationship
between economic status and crime. An enhancement of legitimate in-
come and employment opportunities may or may not induce a shift out
of criminal activity. Research using aggregate data provides only weak
support for the simple proposition that unemployment causes crime.
Moreover, research using such data does not provide convincing tests of
the relationship between low income and crime. In contrast, research
using individual data provides consistent but weak support for the prop-
osition that higher income is associated with lower levels of criminal ac-
tivity, and weak, if any support, for unemployment being significantly
associated with criminal activity. Finally, the programmatic literature
provides glimmers of hope among mostly insignificant program effects.
Nevertheless, we are not prepared to reject the hypothesis that
crime and economic status are related. We contend that the evidence
that we have presented represents at best a very imperfect test of the
BES model and no test whatsoever of the more general HBL model.
The theory predicts a relationship between economic status and crime
only under special conditions, one of which is that the change in eco-
nomic status must be significant enough to induce an exchange of ille-
gitimate activity for legitimate activity or vice versa.
This carries several implications. First, the value of the bundle of
commodities and services consumed by an individual, including the eco-
nomic payoff, must exceed the value of the bundle presently being con-
sumed. For many (most?) drug addicts and alcoholics this condition is
not met. To obtain and to maintain an enhancement in economic sta-
tus, this population is effectively required to substantially decrease its
drug or alcohol intake, the value of which is likely to far exceed the
value of the usual program payoff.
Second, the economic payoff must compensate the individual for
any increase in cost associated with the expenditure of time and effort at
legitimate and illegitimate activity. Thus, individuals who find the
steady, routine, hard work that typifies much legitimate work to be
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highly distasteful are not likely to find the programmatic payoff suffi-
cient inducement to give up illegitimate activity. Conversely, an indi-
vidual for whom a criminal act is extremely repugnant is not likely to
turn to crime because of a substantial reduction in legitimate income.
Finally, improved economic status will have little effect on that seg-
ment of the population that treats leisure time as a variable. Persons in
this group may respond to economic opportunity by accepting legiti-
mate work at the expense of leisure while maintaining their level of ille-
gitimate activity. Alternatively, an individual may simply shift between
leisure and criminal activity, devoting a constant number of hours to
legitimate activity. The latter situation would seem to be the modus oper-
andi underlying much violent crime, crimes against the public order,
drug offenses, and teenage "hell-raising."
Thus, a relationship between crime and economic status exists
under the HBL formulation only with reference to a particular popula-
tion: A population for whom small (marginal) differences in returns are
significant, and for whom legitimate and illegitimate activity are substi-
tutes (i.e., leisure is not variable). If this particular population, which
Zimring and Hawkins called the "marginal group, '8 5 is rather small rel-
ative to the aggregate offender population, then empirical tests for the
existence of a relationship between economic status and crime that rely
upon global estimates of income levels and employment rates, such as
those described above, can be expected to yield inconclusive results.
Once the BES theory's implicit empirical assumptions are exposed
and the population is understood from a "marginal group" perspective,
the disappointing performance of so many rehabilitation programs be-
comes explicable. With few exceptions, rehabilitation programs that
employ economic status instruments have treated populations whose
members generally bear little or no resemblance to the marginal group
presupposed by theory. Individuals treated in these programs include
young teenagers, drug addicts, alcoholics, habitual felons, morals offend-
ers, and individuals who show a strong distaste for steady work at nor-
mal wage rates. Given such a clientele, disappointing results should be
the rule rather than the exception. To be effective, a program must
treat individuals that "fit" the model.
The model's abstract requirements are readily transformed into
meaningful empirical identifiers. Offenders who come closest to fitting
the model tend to be older, more educated, and married. They have no
major alcohol or drug problem; their history demonstrates a willingness
to work; their crime was motivated by a desire for monetary gain; and
85 Zimring & Hawkins, Deterrence and Marginal Groups, 5 J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELIN-
QUENCY 100, 104-105 (1968).
1070 [Vol. 72
ECONOMIC STA TUS AND CRIME
their economic status is quite low. An offender population that con-
forms to this description and is offered some form of economic incentive
almost surely will respond by significantly reducing its recidivism rate.
Our confidence in this proposition is rooted in a theory of human
behavior that is intuitively plausible and that obviously "works," at least
with reference to microeconomic behavior. The application of this the-
ory to offender behavior, qualified as we have indicated above, is con-
ceptually straightforward. Although there is no record of a
rehabilitation program that tests this theory by applying an economic
status instrument to an appropriate offender population, two recent pro-
grams provide a partial, though admittedly a very imperfect, test of our
proposition. Those are the LIFE (including TARP) and the supported
work programs. Despite the inclusion in these programs of population
segments that were clearly inappropriate according to our criteria, the
results for these programs are quite promising.
We recommend the development and implementation of a care-
fully designed set of programs to improve economic viability for a group
of individuals whose criminal activity appears likely to be affected by
improved economic prospects. Once implemented, the program should
be subjected to rigorous evaluation, involving random assignment. An
experimental evaluation of such a program, when combined with de-
tailed time-allocation information on participants, could greatly en-
hance our understanding of both the nature and strength of the
relationship between economic viability and crime and help to develop
effective rehabilitative programs.
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